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PATENT RACES. PRODUCT STANDARDS, AND
INTERNATIONALCOMPETITION
ABSTRACT
Weexamine anticipatory product standards intended to
improvethe strategic position of firms in an international
patentrace where firms do R&D to develop products that are close
substitutes. The effects of a standard are shown to depend on
the way the standard is specified, which firm develops which
product, and on the order in which products are discovered.
Simple standards are, in general, time inconsistent because of
consumerlosses thatoccur when productsruled out by the
standard are discovered before the product set as the standard.
A state contingent standard is shownto be time consistentwhen
compulsory licensing by the foreign firm is introduced.
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andNBER1. Introduction
InternationalR&D competition often results in outcomes where several
firmsdevelop and patent products that are close substitutes.Inthis situation, it is
not uncommon for governments to set anticipatory standards intended to improve
the strategic (competitive) position of their firms. This paper examines the impact
of such standards,andshows that inadynamic, uncertain environment, the use of
simple,anticipatorystandards is problematic. The welfare effects of a standard are
shown to depend on the way the standard is specified, but more importantly on
which firm develops which product and on the order in which products are
discovered. We show that simple standards are, in general, time inconsistent Even
if a standard inaeases welfare after all products are discovered, it still can reduce ex
ante expected welfare becauseconsumersare hurtwhen productsruled out by a
simplestandard arediscoveredbefore the discovery of the productsetas the
standard.Thus the only type of standard which canunambiguouslyIncrease
welfarein a dynamic, uncertain environmentis one thatis complicatedinthe sense
thatit is state-contingent.1
Understanding the effects of product standards is important becausethe
Technology Policy Task Force has recommended the use of standards to "support
U.S.industryintechnologydevelopment (Technology Task Force, 1988, p.
Theaeationofthe Task Force andits recommendations were prompted byconcern
overtheperformanceofU.S. high-technology industries. Since1980the U.S. trade
surplus in high-technologyproducts hasfallen,andtheshare of foreign companies
inU.S. patent registrations has steadily risen.3 U.S. companies appear to be
droppingbehindin patentraces inindustriestheyoncedominated. Par example.
theU.S. market share in consumer electronics has fallenfrom100%in1970 to less
than 5% (TechnologyPalicyTask Force (1988)), and U.S. firmsappearto be behind in
Ithe race to develophigh definition television (HDTV). Similar examplescan be
found in otherhightech industries (Wysocki (1988)).
One example of a standard is one requiring new products to be compatible
with existing ones, such as the Federal Communication Commissions regulation
that HDTV transmission in the United States be compatible with existing
broadcasting channels. This was generally considered to have been a strategicmove
to improve the position of U.S. firms trying to develop HDTV,because it meant the
Japanese MUSE system could not be used in the U.S.without adaptation (Sims
(1988)). When the standard was announced (September 1988), the JapaneseMUSE
system was in working prototype.Zenith was developing a retrocompatible
version, but it was only in the theoretical stage of development and was generally
considered to be inferior to the Japanese version. Hence, retrocompatibility was,in
effect, a standard based on the product being developed domestically.The move was
considered strategic because its announced intention was to alter the Japanese
advantage in the race.
The United States is not alone in this type of standard setting. As iswell
documented by Crane (1978), Europe never adopted a single color TVstandard
because individual governments promoted standards to protect the interestsof their
firms. Hazard and Daems (1988) and Pelkmans and Beuter (1987) alsomake it clear
that the European position on HDTV standards has the same motivation.
This paper examines the impact of standards set for strategic reasonsbefore
products are successfully developed. In order toexamine such policies, it is
important to modet both the racing aspect ofinternational R&D competition and
the simultaneous development of different products by rival firms. InSection 2, we
present a model of uncertain R&D between a foreignand a domestic firm where the
foreign mm has an advantage in developing the superiorof two closely related
products. Whether firms race for the same patent, pursuedifferent patents
2simultaneously, or the lagging firm drops out Is determined endogenously in this
model. This allows us to examine the impact of a standard Imposed before the end
of the race. In the absence of policy, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)
involves the foreign and domestic finn simultaneously pursuing different patents if
the foreign firm has a sufficiently large advantage. In this model,dropping outis
never subgame perfect in the absence of policy if pursuing an alternative patenthas
positive expected return for the lagging firm.
In Sections 3 and 4, we show that the imposition of a standard can alter these
outcomes in several ways. In Section 3, we examine the impact of the lagging firms
government imposing a standard based on the product being developed
domestically. We show it is more likely that both firms will race to develop the
same patent (in particular, the one being developed domestically). Some of the
more interesting effects, however, arise when the foreign and domestic firms still
pursue different patents in equilibrium. We show thatthe standard need not be
welfare improving a ante in this case even if it is certain to improve welfare after
both products are discovered. That is, expected welfare can still be lower because the
standard benefits a domestic firm only after its R&D has succeeded, but consumers
suffer losses after the foreign firm succeeds. Hence, if the foreign firm succeeds first,
losses suffered by consumers before the domestic firm succeeds can outweigh the
gains from this policy after the domestic (inn succeeds. This shows that the
imposition of a standard can be time-inconsistent in two ways. It may not be
optimal to impose it before either product is discovered, but optimal to impose itif
the domestic firm discovers the inferior product first. Also, it may be optimal to
impose it before either product is discovered, but then remove it if the foreign firm
succeeds in developing the superior product first.
In the latter case, the announced standard has limited credibility. Finns may
well expect the lagging firms government to remove the standard if the foreign
3firm discovers Its productfirst.TheFCC,for example, reverseditsdecision on a
color TVstandard inthefiftiesoncea superior system wasdeveloped.4Thus, in
Section4. we consider the effect of a domestic policy that includesa contingency to
adopt the foreign productas a standard onceitis discovered. To capture common
licensingpractices.5 the contingency includesarequirement that the foreignfinn
license its patentto the domestic firm at a minimallee.Aninteresting aspectof this
policy is thatinequilibrium thelaggingfinn may drop outoftheraceand wait to
acquirea licensefrom theforeignfirm.Thepolicy is shown tobetime consistent
whetheror not the lagging firmdrops out.Thatis, whenlicensing occurs, domestic
expected welfare is higher at every date than it would be with no policy.In Section 5
we comparethecontingentstandardandthe domestic standard for an example with
linear demandand constantmarginal cost. Section 6concludes.
Our work differsfrom the literatureon compatibility standards intwo
important ways. First,we examinetheimpactofa standard imposedbefore the
successful completionofR&D. Panell andSaloner(1985 and1986a)andKatz and
Shapiro(1986a and b) focus onthe relation of compatibility and innovation, but they
addressissues relatedtoadoption of exogenously developed technologieswhich are
currentlyavailable. Second, we focus on international competition. Besen and
Saloner (1989), David (1987),and Farrell and Saloner(1988)discuss coordination
problemsinvolvedin international standard setting,and Crane (1979), Pelkmans
and Beuter(1987), and HazardandDaems (1958) discussthe use oftelevision
standards as nontarifftradebarriers to trade. Lecraw (1987) discusses Japanese
standards for a wide range of products as trade barriers.6However, theoretical
modelshave abstracted frominternational issues, so that welfare comparisonsin
the existing literature examine the profits and consumer surplus of all firms and
consumers. To understand unilateral policies, such as the recent FCC regulation,it
4is importantto determine profitsandsurplus ofdomestic residents, as we do Inthis
policyanalysis.
Our work also differs from studies of patent races that have generally
analyzed models in which identical firms compete for the same patent(see
Reinganum (1989) for an excellent survey). One exceptionis the literature on
sequences of races, in which firms competefor the same patent, but are not identical
because the winner of the preceding race earns greater profit during the current race.
Anotherexceptionis the literature on preemption and leapfrogging. Pudenberg,
Gilbert,Stiglitz,andTirole(1983,hereafterItS?) analyze several related models in
which one finn has an advantageina race for the same patent.Inone of these
models the finn behind drops out of the race lmnwcliately (and the leader does R&D
until discovery). In the others, the laggard will not only stay in the race, but also
may be able to leapfrog into the leadership roleif the R&D process involves two
distinct stages with random discovery or if there is imperfect monitoring of the
rival's R&D effort. Uppman and Mccardle (1988) show that if the decision to do
R&D is made at discrete dates, then laggard drops out only if its rival has a large
enough lead. This paper contributes to this literature by showing a laggardwill not
drop out if it can develop a related, though inferior, patent.
Several of the issues we raise are addressed in the international trade
literature. Dixit (1988a and b), Bagwell and Staiger (1989), and Beath (1990) examine
international R&D competition in the context of patent races. Although they allow
asymmetries among firms, these studies consider firms racing to developthe same
product. Krishna (1988) and Yanagawa (1990) examine trade policy in the presence
of compatibility issues, but they do not examine the use of standards or explicitly
consider R&D issues.Finally, Staiger and Tabellini (1987) examine the time
consistency of international trade policy, but they do not address R&D orstandards
issues.
52. A Model of Uncertain R&D With Substitutes
Consideratwo country world in which a domestic andaforeign finnchoose
whetheror not to do R&D to developa new productA. R&D isSkybecause the
date of discovery isstochastic,and because winning the patent for A does not
preventthe developmentofa close, but imperfect, substitute for A. That is,
winning the patent for A does not guarantee monopolyin the standard sense
becausethere isa close substitute for A that can be developed. This can occurif
patent protection is imperfect, as is often the case acrosscountries. It can also occur
if there are many substitutes for A which are different from the view of patent law,
so it is not feasible to obtain patents for all of them (see Gilbertand Newbery (1982)
for a thorough discussion of this possibility).
Each firm can also do R&D to develop a new product B which is a dose, but
imperfect, substitute for A. Further assume A is superior toB in that each firm
wouldpreferto win the patent for A. To keep the analysis tractable, assume neither
firm can,or will,trytodevelop both A and B.Scarcityoftrainedresearchers and
research facilities canimplythatconductingtwo R&Dprogramssimultaneously
either reduces theprobability ofsuccessineach program, or increases the cost of
R&D in each program, or both. In this event each firm conducting only one R&D
program at a time can be derived as an equilibrium outcome,although we do not do
soinorder to avoid complicating the analysis unnecessarily, If, as noted above, it is
infeasible to patentall ofthe close substitutes for A,thefirm that has the patent for
A cannot preventits rival from developing some substitute. Therefore, there is no
loss of generalityindealing with only two products. Aandsome substitute. B.
2 m
=Z (A) be the total flow profitearnedby finn i i it has
iii=1 m
discovered A but B hasnot beendiscovered,where isfirmIsflow profit from
countrym. Let Jt(A;B)= (A;B) be the flow profit earnedbyfirm iif It has
m=i
6discovered A and B has been discovered. Define x(B) and(B;A) analogously.
Then the assumption
(Al) nr(M> maxbrjm(B),zr(A;B))andxr'(B;A)<minfrm(B),nrt(AB))
embodies both the notion that A and B are substitutes and that A is superior to B in
each market. We assume markets are segmented and that in the absenceof
government policy, profits in each market are positive (i.e., ,4tt(.)> 0).Then (Al)
implies both n(A) >z1(A;B) andic1(B) >,t1(B;A),and n1(A) >x1(B)and
x(A;B)>ir1(B;A).Under this specification of R&D, (Al) guarantees the expected
return from discovering A is greater than that from discovering B when the R&D
costs of A and S are the same. Also note this does not assume A is superior enough
to B in production that it1(A;B) >n1(B).Having a monopoly with B may provide
greater profit than producing A when B is available. This profit ranking can hold
with a variety of differentiated product models, including Shaked and Sutton's
(1982) vertically differentiated demand structure and models with network
externalities and variety (Farrell and Saloner (1986b)).
The discovery date of each new product is assumed to be stochastic and
exponentially distributed with parameter g, so that if either firm does R&D. the
probability it will discover the new product between times t and t +dtis gdt Firms
incur a constant flow cost of development, and these costs may differ by firm as well
as the product being developed. Finn i must pay a constant flow cost kiA >0to do
R&Don Aoraconstantflowcostk15>OtodoR&DonB(i1,2). Thenfirmihas
an advantage relative to firm jindeveloping A if kiA <kiA. This is the most
tractable way of giving one firm an advantage in doing R&D on A. This modeling
choice Is not macial because the analysis can be generalized to hazard rates that differ
among firms or innovations, or that depend on accumulated R&D experience, as in
FGST (1983) and Uppman and McCardle (1988)
7Because we are interested in subgame perfectequilibria(SPE), we must
consnct payoffs which incorporate optimal behavior by the remaining Finn after its
rivalhasdiscovered A or B. First, suppose A is discovered by firm i, but B has not
been discovered. Then firm j(j = 1,2,J1)can eitherdrop out or do R&D onB. lilt
dropsout Itearns 0. If it does R&D onB,it paysflowcost kw until it succeeds,and
earns
ii1(B;A)
thereafter.Hence, the expectedreturnfrom R&D onB, discounted
back to the discoverydateof A, Is
SIB
= [4s/r)it(B;A) — lcJBJ/(r + a). (1)
where S isusedtodenotethe fact thatB Is thesecond productdiscovered (by J)
and ris the common discountrate. Note that the assumption
(A2)Qx/r)m/B;A) >forj=1,2
guarantees that B will be developed even if A is available.
Similarly, firm i earns z1(A) in each period after A is discovered, but before B
is discovered, and jr1(A;B) in each period after B is discovered. Hence, firm is
expected return from A, discounted back to its discovery date, is
=[,.(A)+W/r)it(AB)J/(r+
Thenotationdenotes that A is the first process discovered (by 0.
if B is discovered first by firm i, then finn jcaneither drop out and earn 0 or
do R&D on A and earn the expected return (discounted back to the discovery of B)
5JA
= t(u/rhc/A;B) — kjA)/(r +
Theassumption
(AS) (u/r)x(AM) > for J = 1,2
guarantees that A will be developed even if B is available. As noted above, (Al)
implies A > B kiA (superiority of A in production implies its superiority
in development if the flow costs are the same). Firm i's expected return from B,
discounted back to its discovery date, is
iu =Em?)+@/tht1(B;A)J/(r+10. (4
SNotice (Al) also impliesFIA>FiBMore importantly, there is an incentive for a
firm ata disadvantage in a race for A to begin tryingto develop B immediately,
rather than race for A and develop B if It loses the race. If it discovers B first, it earns
monopoly profit It(B)untilA is discovered.
Assume the R&D game begins at t =0.Optimal behavior alter discovery of A
orB is givenabove. Let a denote the strategy of doing R&D on A until its discovery
(byeither firm),bdenote the strategyofdoing R&DonBuntilits discovery (by
eitherfinn), andddenote the strategy of doing nothing unlessand until discovery
of A or B by the rival. Assuming that the discovery dates for A and B are
exponentially distributed with constantparameterji allows thestrategies and payoffs
forthis game to be specified in a simple way. In particular, reduced-form payoffscan
be computed and the game can be analyzed as if it were a one-shot game. Table I
gives theexpectedpayoffs to finn 1 for all possible strategies of firm 2. We omit the
payoffs to firm2becausethey aredefinedanalogously.
Itis easy to see from these payoffs that delaying R&D cannot be an
equilibrium in this model.7 This is because (A2) and (AS) ensure that a firm's
expectedreturn to doing R&D on either A or B is greater than thereturnto delaying,
regardless of itsrivalsstrategy. As long as discoveringeither producthas apositive
expected return, then itissurely better forafirm to begin R&Dimmediatelybecause
thereis achance itwilldiscoverits product first. Thereforethe only question
question is whether a firm conducts R&DonA or B. From Table 1, one cansee that
— F10)>kIA —kIBimplies that finn I will do R&D on A regardless of firm
2s strategy. This condition simply says that firm l's expected flow return from
being first to discover A, net of the flow cost of R&D, is greater than that from being
first to discover B. Conversely, 1A — <kI — 1'IB'then firm l's expected
flow return from being first to discover B (net flow cost of R&D) exceeds that from
A, and firm 1 will do R&D on B regardless of firm 2's strategy. Analogous
9arguments apply to firm 2,so thatthe results ofTheorem1 follow immediately.
Formalproofs of this theorem and all remaining ones in the paper, are given in the
Appendix.
Theorem 1. Under (A1)-(A3), delaying is never a SPE. Moreover:
(I)(a,a) is the unique SPE if and only
—k8<'"IA —F18)for i1,2.
(ii) (a,b) is the unique SPE if and only if both (cIA —18
—
and2A —k2B >PW2A "2&
(iii) (frg) is the unique Sfl if andonly ifboth — > — FIB)
and k2A —1c28 <2A —F28).
(iv) (b,b) is the unique SPE if and only if lilA _kjB >g(F IA —F10) for i =1,2.
(v) There are multiple SPE and SPE in randomized strategies only if
lilA —= u(F,A
—
F18)for at least one i.
Figure 1 is a convenient way to describe the results in Theorem 1. The lines
IL(F1A —l&="IA
— and1'"m
— = — dividethe space into four
quadrants, where equilibria are as indicated. These lines intersect at 1. where
—"lB>0for both i, because (Al) implies that it is better to be first to develop A
titan >iBNotice that the equilibrium of this game is unique for all values
of parameters such that —* — 1iBfor both i =1,2.The reason for this
is that a is firm is strongly dominant strategy if and only if —
"ID<IL(FIA
—
andb is firm i's strongly dominant strategy if and only if
—> iA
—
Becausethe set of parameter values such that either —kID= —
— 1'2BU(F2A — orboth has measure zero (in the set of all possible
parameter values In the plane), this game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
generically.
As is clear from Figure 1, whether or not one firm has an advantage over the
other in developing a product depends on the flow costs of R&D. The easiest way to
see this is to observe that, if flow R&D costs are the same for both firms and
10products, then kiA —= "lA — 1'IB — 0. The corresponding point In the figureis
the origin,and (a,a) is the unique SPE. However, If firm I is given a large enough
advantagein developing A (by Increasingk2A enough),then thepoint (kIA— k15,
k2A— 1'2B in the figuremoves upward along thek2A_l2B axisuntil (a,b) is the
uniqueSPE. The latterequilibriumisthemost interestingonefor our purposes.
Not only isitconsistent withtheobservationthat finns often racetodevelop
imperfect substitutes,butalso itallowsus to examine the Impactof product
standards announced beforeproductsaredeveloped.
3.A Standard Based on theDomesticProduct
In this section, we assume finn i is owned by residents of country I and and
that its advantage in developing A Is large enough that (a,b) Is the unique SPE in
the absence of government standards. To consider the strategic use of standards, we
assume firm 2 is owned by residents of country 2 and that its government sets B as a
domestic standard, so that A cannot be sold in its market (without adaptation). We
show that setting such a standard before the successful completion of R&D may not
increase country 2's expected welfare even if It is certain to improve welfare at the
end of the game.
Let the superscript p denote a variable when B is the standard, so that firm is
total flow profit under this policy Is denoted by xj'(.)BeauseA annot be sold in
country 2 under this policy, 4(A) =x(A)cx1(A) and 4(¼B) x(AB) <x1(kB).
Aslong as country Is government is inactive, j'(B) =x(B)bemuse B can be sold in
each market. The flow profit from B when A is available increases under the policy
because the firm selling B in country 2 earns monopoly profit from that market.
That is, 4(B;A) =4(BA)+x(B)>z1(B).Notice that this presumes an adapter
cannot be developed to bring A in line with the standard. If an adapter could be
developed, which would not increase As production cost, then the standard would
IIhave no effect.Ifan adapter could be developed, but waswstlyto produce, then the
sLandardwould have the same qualitativeeffectsas itdoesinthis analysis.
Thusthispolicyhastheeffectofdeceasingthe return to disc.nvering Aand
increasingthe return to discovering B for both firms. This impliesSIA< 51A' °
thatIn order toensure A is developed,(A3)mustbe strengthened to
(A3Y@/r)lif(AB)> kfor j1,2.
Italso implies >Sj,so that (AZ) still ensures that B is developed. Finally it
impliesFcFiAand4'B>Fjakrbothfirms.sothat(a.b)iSnOW1eSs11kelY.afld
(b,b)is more likely,to be the S1'E of the R&D game. In terms ofthe figure.the
standard causes the lines to shift so that the point I is northwestofits location in the
absene of policy.
Theorem 2.Under(Al), (A2), and(AS)'theunique SEE with thisstandardis
(0(a,b) ifand only ifboth k74 —kIBcu(Fç4 — and — k2B>
and
(ii) (kb) if and only if and kiA — kiB > WF.'A — i&for i = 1,2.
Moreover, suppose that absent this standard,the SEE isfirm I develops A and finn
2 develops B. Then under this standard, the SPE is less likely to be that finn 7
developsA andfinn 2 developsB, and more likelyto be that the firms race frr B.
AlthoughtheSfl may change, for purposesof comparison we assume
throughout the paper that the SPE is finn I develops A and firm 2 develops B with
or without the standard. It follows immediately from Theorems 1 and 2 that with
or without the standard, the unique SPE is firm I develops A and finn 2 develops B
if and only if
kIA
—<'A and —k23> —
Wewould expect this outcome, forexample, firmIs cost advantage is sufficiently
large or If country Ts market is small relative to the total market forA.8
12It is clear that firm I loses and firm 2 gains from B as a standard. However
this does not imply that welfare changes in the same directions because flow welfare
inacountry isitsfirms flow profitplus its flow consumer surptus. Let flow
consumersurplus in country i in the absence of policy be C1(A)ifonly A has been
discovered. C1(B) if only B has been discovered, and C(A.B) if both have been
discovered. With only two firms, a natural assumption to make is
(A4) C(A.B) > C(A) > C1(B).
The last inequality embodies the notion that A is superior to B for consumers in
both countries, while the first implies consumers as a group are better off with
duopoly competition when both A and B are available than when only one of them
is sold by a monopolist. Under the standard, we assume
(A5) CI'(A) = C1(A). C(B) = C1(B). and C'(A,B) = C1(A,B), and
(.46) C(A) 0< C2(A), C(B) C2(B), and C(A,B) = C2(B).
(A5) says the standard does not change consumer surplus in country I because A
and B can still be sold there. Given (A4). (A6) says the standard lowers consumer
surplus in country 2 once A is discovered because it cannot be sold there. Notice
that (A4) does not contradict the usual consumer surplus ranldngs of competitive
models with network externalities, where a standard of A or B might be preferred to
both products being available at price equal to marginal cost. Consumers in this
model prefer variety (I.e. both A and B available) because there is increased
competition if both are available.
There are three times at which welfare comparisons can be made: the
beginning of the game (t0); the first discovery date; and the second discovery date
(i.e.. when both have been discovered). Suppose firm I succeeds first. Then in the
absence of policy, expected welfare, discounted back to the discovery date of A, in
each country is
Wl(P1A) (it1(A) +C1(A) + @/r)[1r1(AB) + C1(A,B)])/(r+s) and (6)
isW2(S2B) =(C2(A)+(1i/r)[g2(B;A)+C2(A,B)]
—k2&/(r+ (7)
Similarly, if firm 2 succeeds first, then expected welfare, discounted back to the
discovery date of B, in each country is
Wl(SIA) =(C1(B)+(i/r)[x1(A;B)+C1(A,B)] — klA}/&+F')and (8)
W2(F2B) =(n2(B)+C2(B)+(g/r)[n(B;A)÷ C2(A,B)J}/(r +10. (9)





W2(a,b) =LtW2(F28) + iW2(S25)
—k2BI/(r+211). (11)
Expressions for expected welfare under the standard are defined analogously
to (6)-(11) with i4'(.)andCr(s) replacing it(.)andC(•). Under our assumptions it
is clear that the standard lowers expected welfare In country I at all three dates.
However, the effect of the standard on expected welfare in country 2 is less dear.
Firm 2 gains after both A and B are discovered because it is always a monopolist in
its own market, 4(B;A) >jr2(B;A).But consumers lose after A is discovered because
they cannot consume it, C(A) =0c C2(A) and C(A,B) C2(A) c C2(A,B).
Although the net effect is ambiguous, some conclusions can be drawn. Suppose
that, after both A and B are discovered, the standard hurts consumers more than it
benefits firm 2, C2(A,B) —C2(A)>x(U;A)
—
it2(B;A),so flow welfare is lower. Then
expected welfareat thefirst discovery date is also lower whether A or B is discovered
first, W2(FB)<W2(F211)and W2(SB)<W2(9211),and therefore initial expected
welfare is lower under this standard, W(a,b) <W2(a,b).
Theorem3. Assumetheimpositionof acompatibility standard by country 2
hurtsits consumers more than it benefits its firm, and therefore reduces flow
welfare after both A and B are discovered. Then the standard alsoreducescountry
2's initial expected welfare and its expected welfare at the first discovery date
whether A or B is discovered first.
14Now suppose instead that,alter A andB are discovered, thestandard benefits
firm2more than It hurts consumers, so flow welfare ishigher. Thenexpected
welfare at the first discovery date Is higher under the standard if B is discovered first,
W2(F8) > Wz(F2B). However, this policy stiH has an ambiguous effect on expected
welfare at the first discovery date if A is discovered first, and thus on initial expected
welfare aswell. This is particularly interestingbecause It shows that Imposition of a
compatibility standard may not be a timeconsistent policy.By a time consistent
policy we mean one that increases expected welfare, compared to that withno
policy, at every date
Thegrca_A• Assume the imposition of a compatibility standard by country 2
benefits its firm more than it hurts its consumers, and thus increases flow welfare
after both A and B are discovered. Then this policy can also increase both initial
expected welfare andexpectedwelfare at the first discoverydate. However, itcan
also be time inconsistent in two ways.
(I)Itcanincrease initial expected welfare, decrease expected welfare at the first
discovery dateifAisdiscovere4 first, and thenincrease flowwelfareafter
Bis alsodiscovered.
(ii) Itcan decreaseinitial expected welfare,increase expectedwelfareatthe first
discovery date if Bisdiscoveredfirst,and then increase flow welfareafter
A isalsodiscovered.
Thatthisstandard increases flow welfare in country 2 afterbothA and B are
discovered can, but need not, imply that it always increases expected welfare in
country 2 before both are discovered. It implies only that expected welfare at the first
discovery date is higher if B is discovered first. The standard can increase or
decrease expected welfare at the first discovery date If A is discovered first and initial
expected welfare. The intuition is simply that the standard hurts consumers after A
is discovered,but helpsfirm 2 only after both A and B are discovered. If B is
15discovered first, then the only effect occurs after both have been discovered, when
welfareis higher withthe standard (by assumption in this case). However, if A is
discovered first, then consumers are hurt thereafter, but finn 2 benefits only after it
discovers B. Consumers' expected loss between the discovery times a1 A and B may
be large enough to outweigh the flow welfare increase after B is discovered. If so,
expected welfare at the date A is discovered is lower with the standard. In fact, this
interim loss may be large enough that initial expected welfare is also higher with the
standard.
Although it is more natural to think of country 2's government setting B as a
standard, it is worth considering the effect of A as a standard. The government
might well think that imposing A as a standard could induce firm 2 to race for the
superior product. It is straightforward to show that (a,a) is more likely to be the
equilibrium with A as a standard. This is because A as a standard in country 2
increases the expected return to either firm from being the first to discover A. and it
decreases the expected return to either firm from being second to discover B.
However, with uncertain R&D it is not clear that firm 2 will win the race or that
welfare will improve. Moreover, firm 2 may have enough of a disadvantage in
R&D on A that (a,b) remains the equilibrium, in which case both firm 2 and
consumers in country 2 lose. Firm 2 loses because it can't sell B in its own market
(without an adaptor). Consumers lose for the same reason they lose with B as a
standard. If B is discovered first, they lose between the first and second discovery
dates because they cannot consume the product. They lose at the end of the race
because A is sold by a monopolist rather than both A and B being sold by duopolists.
These results suggest that setting anticipatory standards can be problematic,
regardless on which standard is set. The results are driven, In part, by the uncertain
discovery dates, but they occur, in part, because either standard creates a monopoly
in countiy 2 even after both products are discovered. Thus, even with a standard
16based on the superior product, A, consumers would prefer duopoly competition if
bothAattdB areavailable.
4.Toward a Time-Consistent Standard
Suppose country 2's government decides to set A as a standard if it is
discovered by finn 2 or if firm I discovers it and licenses the patent to firm 2 at a
fixed fee (set by the government). If firm I discovers A, but does not license the
patent. B is set as a standard once It is discovered. Although this policy seems
complicated, the results in Section 3 show that contingencies such as this may be
necessary to design an anticipatory policy that would unambiguously improve
welfare. This particular policy is consistent with the strategic motive to improve
firm2scompetitiveposition in the race because it benefits firm 2 regardlessof
which product is discovered first. As we shall show in this section, it can also
benefit consumers in country 2 (relative to either of the standards considered in
Section 3) because of duopoly competition when licensing occurs.
We continue to assume (5) so that (a,b) is the unique SEE in the absence of
policy and when B is the standard. In addition, we focus on the case where B as a
standard benefits firm 2 more than it hurts consumers in country 2 once both
products are discovered.9 This entails no lossofgenerality since it is the only case in
which B as a standard is time inconsIstent. The time inconsistency arises only
because, even though the standard increases flow welfare after both products are
discovered, consumers in country 2 lose forever if A is discovered first, but firm 2
gainsonly after Bis discovered. Therefore, a time consistent policy must have the
property thatbothfirm2 and consumersincountry2 benefit fromitwhichever
productis discovered first,
We shall refer to the game with B as a standard as the p game and to the game
with A as a contingent standard as the c game. Suppose A is discovered first by finn
171 in the c game. Then firm I can either of fer a license to finn 2 at fee L, in which
case firm 2 can buy the license or not, or not offer a license, If firm I offers a license
at fee Land firm 2 buys, then firm l's expected return is
FcA =[E1(AA)/r]+L, (12)
and firm 2s expected return is
SB =[x2(AA)/rI—L (13)
where z1(A;A) is firm is flow duopoly profits from selling A in both markets. U
firm I does not license the patent, then country 2's government will not enforce B
as the standard until its discovery because it is not credible to do so. Therefore, If
firm 1 does not license, its expected return is
=
bt1(A)+(ss/r)xçCA;B)I/(r+g),and (14)







issufficient to guarantee that firm I will offer a license for any nonnegative fee (i.e.,
>I4'for any L ￿ 0). Notice that in order for (A?) to hold, finn Is profit from
selling A in both markets when it has licensed A must exceed its profit from its own
market when A and B are both available. In this case (A?) holds for a high enough
hazard rate because increasing the hazard rate speeds up the expected discovery date
of B, and thus reduces the length of time firm 1 can earn monopoly profit from A in
both markets. The assumption
(A8) ,r2(AA) > + it2(B) = 4(B;A)
is sufficient to guarantee that firm 2 will buy a license at a minimal positive fee (i.e..
> fora sufficiently small but positive fee L). This condition simply says
flow profit if it buys the license exceeds flow profit under the standard when A is
available.10
18Now supposeB is discovered first. Then firm 2 produces B for sale in both
countries at least until A is discovered. The outcome of the licensing gamenow
depends, in part, on whether firm 2 can sell both A and B in country I when it buys
a license for A. Because this would reduce firmflow profit from its own market
(compared to duopoly production of A in both countries), it is reasonable to assume
that firm I will not sell a license unless fim 2 agrees to stop selling B in country I.
Hence, if firm I offers a license at fee L and firm 2 buys, then firm 1 earns
1x1(A;A)/rl +Land firm 2 earns [x2(A;A)/rJ —LOtherwise, B becomes the standard,
so firm I earns ir(A;B)/r and firm 2 earns jt(B;A)/r. Again, (AZ) and (A8) are
sufficient to ensure A is licensed if it is discovered second by firm 1.
Theorem 5. Suppose country 2's government adopts the contingent standard
policy and A is discovered by firm I. Then, under (Al), (A2), (A3)ç (A7), and (A8),
there exist values <0and>0suchthat the unique SPE of the licensing
subgame induced by this policy is firm I offers the license at fee L and firm 2 buys
the license for any Le(L1,L2).
The proof of Theorem 5 shows that country 2s government can choose a
small, but positive, license fee such that licensing occurs if A is discovered by firm 1.
Thus, whether A is discovered first or second, or by firm I or 2, it becomes the
standard in country 2, ex post. As was the case with A as an arbitrary standard, this
means that (a,a) is more likely to be the equilibrium in the c game than with no
policy. In (act, in the c game (A2) is not sufficient to ensure that B is developed by
firm jifA has been discovered. To allow that possibility, we make the stronger
assumption
(A2)' (is/r)nj'(B;A) >k;forj =1,2
Even though this contingent standard makes doing R&D on B less attractive, it is
still possible that (a,b) will be the equilibrium. Notice, however, that now there is
an incentive for firm 2 to drop out of the race and wait to acquire a license for A.
19Dropping out has the advantage of eliminating the uncertain flow costs of
developing B, but also has the disadvantage of eliminating the possibility of earning
monopoly profit with B.
Theorem6:Under (Al), (A2)', (A3)', (A7), and (AB), if(5)holds and
—> — thentheuniqueSPEforall L€(L1,L2) is:
(V(a,b) if k28 <px2(W/(r + Id.
(ii) (a4) if k28 >px2(B)/(r+Id.
In the c game, firm is advantage in developing A does not ensure that firm 2
will develop B in equilibrium, as it did in the p game and in the absence of policy.
Finn 2 will deviate from this outcome, to wait to license the patent for A, if the flow
cost of doing R&D to discover B is greater than discounted expected monopoly profit
with B. Several remarks about this are in order. First, it is possible that only A may
be discovered under this policy even though both products would be discovered
with no policy and with B as the standard. B never is discovered if A is discovered
first. This must occur if firm 2 delays in equilibrium, but it can also occur if firm 2
tries to develop B. Second, if firm 2 does delay, then it is obviously giving up the
chance of discovering B first and earning monopoly profit until discovezy of A.
Hence this indicates that delaying is more likely to be an equilibrium the lower the
expected return from discovering B first. That is, delaying is more likely the smaller
the flow profit from B and/or the larger the flow cost of discovering B. Delaying is
also more likely the higher the return from acquiring the license, or the larger the
duopoly profit from A and/or the smaller the license fee. Third, firm I is even
willing to give a license to firm 2 (i.e., L 0) because this ensures firm l's product is
adopted as a standard.
The remaining question of interest is whether the contingent policy is time
consistent. The following theorem shows that if B as a standard increases flow
20welfare at the end of the game, the contingent standard policy is indeed time
consistent.
Theorem 7.Assume the conditions of Theorem 6 and C2(A,A)￿
where C2 (A,A) is country 2 s consumer surplus from duopoly production of A. If
flow welfare in country 2 after both A and B are discovered is higher with B as the
standard than in the absence of policy, then the contingent standard policy is time-
consistent (i.e., expected welfare in country 2 at the beginning of the game, at the
first discovery dale, and at the end of the game are higher with this policy than with
no policy).
Theintuition(orthis result is straightforward. if B is discoveredfirst,then in
theperiod before Ais discoveredflowwelfareis thesante with both policiesas with
nopolicy. Once A is discovered, whether It is first or second, then the contingent
standardresults in licensing. After this occurs, flow welfare is higher with the
contingent standard than with B as a standard (which by hypothesis is higher than
withno policy).Firm2's flow profit must be higher becauseotherwise it would not
buya license. Consumersincountry 2 arebetter offbecauseconsumersurplus from
duopolyproduction of Aexceeds that from monopoly production of A, and
thereforethat from monopoly production of B by (A4).Hence,the contingent
standard is timeconsistentinthe sense thatit increases expected welfare, compared
tothat with no policy, atevery date.
5. An Example
Thissectionpresents a simple market model to show that the results of
Sections3 and4 arenot vacuous.Assumethedemand forgood Aincountry





and thedemandfor B in Jis = — —
where D1 and a arepositiveconstants, is the output of A produced for sale in j,
and is the output of B producedforsale in j. Assume the constantaveragecost
21of producing A or B is c, where 0 c a cc <znin(D11D2).Note a is a measure of the
superiority of A. Also assume a c min(D1 —c,!)2
—c),so A is not superior enough
thatB cannotbe produced when A isavailable.
If firmIdevelops A and finn 2 develops B,Nashequilibriumflow profitsin
theabsenceof policy (withquantitiesasstrategies) are,t1(A)[CD1 + a—c)2 +
CD2 + a—c)2]/4,x1(AB) =[CD1 + 2a—c)2+CD2 + 2a—c)21/9, g2(B) lCD1 — c)2+
CD2 — c)2]/4 andu2(B;A) = — a—()2+CD2 — a-c)21J9. flow consumer surplus





x2(B),4(BA) = — a—c9/91+
(CD2
—c)2/4LC4'(A) =C1(A),C(B) =C1(B).
c4'(A,B) =C1(A,B), C(A)0, and C(B) =C(A,B) = C2(B).One can verify these
satisfy (Al) and(ASHA6).Moreover, flowcosts ofR&D can always be chosen so
that(a,b) is the equilibrium with B as the standard. Then ordinary algebra then
givesthefollowing.
Lemma.
(I)W(F)W2(4B)andonlyif ac2 — c)/2.
(ii) Ifp/r￿ 3/2,then W2(a,b)> I%(a,b) for alla, but if p/r￿ 3/2, then there
exists aunique aw such thatW2(a,b)Vit(a,b) if and only if a aw.
whereaW is definedby + aW
—c?+2qz/rX4a
— — = 0and
O.caw<(D2_c)/2.
(iii) Ifpir ￿3,thenW2(S2B) > W2(ScB) fir alla; butifp/r >3,then there aiss
aunique assuchthat W2(S28)W2(S8) if and onlyifa a5. where a5
isdefined by + as —+ (z/r)t4]5 —— di = o and 0 c a5 < aw <
—c)/2.
Inthis example, after bothA and Bare discovered,the gain to firm 2 from B
as a standard exceeds the loss to consumersif andonly Ua cCD2 — c)/2. However.
in order for the standard inthep game to inaease expected welfare In all casesalso
22requires that the hazard rate p. be large relative to the discount rate r. This
additionalconditionis needed to insure that the future gains after both have been
discoveredarelarge enough to offset the expected loss to consumers if A is
discovered first.
If licensing occurs in the c game, then firm 2's profit is x2(A;A) =
[(D1+a — c)2+(D2+a — c)21/9,and consumer surplus in country I is C2(A,A)
+a — a2>C2(A).It then follows from Theorem 7 that the contingent standard
improves welfare at all dates for any ac(D2 —a/isuch that (A?) and (As) hold (so
that licensing occurs if A is discovered first). For this example, (A?) requires
((D1 ÷ a—c)2 +(D2+a—c)2]((1.25r/R)—11< —(D1+2a—
and (AS) requires
(D1 +a—c)2+ (D2+a—c)2> (D1—a—c)2 +2.25(D2—c)2.
It is straightforward to show that these conditions and a <(ID2
—c)/2 can hold
simultaneously (for example, set=12,D1 =10,a =4,and c =2).
6. Conclusion
This paper has examined anticipatory product standards in an international
setting where one government imposes a domestic standard to alter the competitive
position of its firm in an R&D race.Aswe noted earlier, governments often impose
standards for precisely this reason. Public policy debates on the efficacy of such
standards have focused on such issues as whether standards should be announced
before products are developed, whether they indeed alter the relative positions of
domestic and foreign firms in races, and whether consumer losses from standards
outweigh any benefits to domestic firms. Our work shows that the answers to these
questions depend crucially on the way standards are defined, as well as the
underlying R&D competition.
23We addressed these questions in the contextofa patent race between a
domesticand a foreignfirm, where the foreign firm has an advantage in developing
thesuperior of two closely related products. Finns choose whether to race to
developasingle product, develop different products,ordrop out of the race. In the
absenceofa standard, the foreignfirm will doR&Donthe superior product andthe
domesticfirm willrace to developan imperfect substitute if the foreign(inns
advantage is large enough.
Ourresults show thata standard may or may not alter firms' equilibrium
strategies.An important point to come out of the analysis isthatsimple
anticipatorystandards can be problematicevenwhen they do not change the
equilibrium. Because discovery dates are uncertain, a simple standard imposed
before the successful completion of R&D may decrease expected welfare even it it is
certain to improve flow welfare at the end of the race. This is because the standard
benefits the domestic firm only after its R&D has succeeded, but consumers suffer
losses once the foreign firm succeeds. Thus a standard can be time inconsistent if
the foreign firm discovers its product before the domestic firm is successful. For this
reason, contingent policies such as the one considered in the c game can be Pareto
superior because they allow consumers and firms to benefit regardless of which
product is discovered first.
Notice that both the simple and contingent standards make it more likely that
firms will race to develop the product favored by the standard. In this regard, our
analysis shows that standards may Indeed result in firms dropping out of the race.
Although the lime consistent standard examined here benefits the domestic finn. It
does so because licensing is possible, so that if the (inn has a large enough cost
disadvantage it will drop out of the race. Finally, notice that we did not make
welfare comparisons for cases in which a standard would alter the equilibrium.
24Suth comparisonscouldbe made, however, it wouldnot besurprising to find that
timeconsistent policies were even more complicated inthosecases.
25Footnotes
15e David and Greenstein (1990) for an excellent survey of needed research on
the use of standards in dynamic environments.
also p.33and pp.205-210on the Task Forces recommendation that
government policy be aimed at "restoring' the consumer electronics industry.
3me share of foreign companies in U.S. patent registrations rose from 35% In
1975 to 47% in 1988(U.S. Departmentof Commerce, 199). See McCulloch (1988) for
an analysis of U.S. high technology exports.
4This particular case involved a switch in the standard from the CBS system
that was not retrocompatible to the NTSC retrocompatible system developed by
other domestic firms. See Hanrd and Daems (1988).
5See Farrell and Shapiro (1991) on licensing requirements associated with
standard setting of HDTV.
6Mayer (1982) examines a theoretical model of the protective effect of standards.
but his analysis is not strategic and he abstracts from issues of compatibility and
innovation.
7Delaying can be an equilibrium in certain policy scenarios, such as that
considered in Section 4. It can also be an equilibrium when there are spilovers or if
imitation is possible. It is also possible for (a,b)tobe an equilibrium with spillovers
(or imitation) because a firm earns monopoly profits for sonic period if it discovers
its product first. Results for the race with spillovers are available from the authors.
81n the case of HDTV, some analysts predict that Japanese and European
markets will grow faster than the U.S. market. Hence the Japanese may not find It
worthwhile to modify their development strategy.
B as a standard reduces welfare after both products are discovered, it is not a
credible policy for country 2s government. This lack of credibility alters the
expected returns to firms I and 2 so that licensing will not occur in equilibrium.
Thus the benefits associated with licensing under the contingent policy we consider
would not occur.
10(A7) and (AS) are stronger than is necessary for licensing to occur. All that
is necessary is that FA > and >ZB•A natural sufficient condition (which
is also weaker than (A?) and (AS)) is that the present value of both finns' profits
under licensing exceeds the present value of both firms expected profits without
licensing,
(iv1(AA) +xjAA)1/r>(x (A) +(is/r)14'(A;B)+4(B;A)ll/(r+
Wemake the stronger assumptions¼ecause they guarantee the contingent standard
is time consistent under natural rankings of consumer surplus.
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Payoffs to firm I if firm 2's sfrav is to do R&D on B
P1(a,b) =(nP1A +1A —kIA)f(r + 211)
P1(b),) =4IB÷ IA —ki&/(r+ 214
P1(d,b) + JI)





P1(s11s2) is the expected payoff to firm 1 (discounted to t a0)if firm I usesand


































These facts prove the "only if" parts of (O-Ov).
Nowobserve that(A1MAS) imply P1(ab) >P1(d,b),P1(a,d) >P1(dM,P1(b,a)>
P1(d,a),P1(b,d) > P1(d,cfl,P2(b,a)> P2(b,d), P2(d,a)>P2(d4),P2(a,b) >P2(a,d),and
P2(d,b) >I'2(d4).
Supposethat S(PIA -. FIB)> — kIB.Then P1(a,s2) >P1(b,s2)for all
(a,b,d). This plus P1(b,a) ,P1(d,a)implies P1(a,a) >P1(d,a),and so
P1 (d,s2) for all $2E(a,b,d}also. That Is, a is finn l's strongly dominant strategy if
—1&>kIA —kiB. Now suppose instead that I1(FIA —FIB)ck1
—
k19.
Then P1(b.Q >P1(a,s&for all(a,b,d). This plus P1(a,b) >P1(d,b)implies P3(b.b)>
P1(d,b), and so P1(b,s2) >P1(d,s2)for all s2e (a,b4). Hence, b is firm l's strongly
dominant strategy if is(FIA —1B< — B•Analogous arguments show finn
2s strongly dominant strategy is a if U(F2A —2B>2A
—'2B'and b if
U(F —F25)c k2A -k.These results prove the If" parts of (iXiv). and (v) then
follows immediately.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof of (i) and (ii) are entirely analogous to that in
Theorem I. Noteand j'8arecomputed as in (2) and (4)with4(A). 11ç(kB).
4(B),and 4w;A) replacing x1(A),x1(AB),It(B). and x1(B;A). It then follows that
—ItB<FIA
—
FIBfor I =1,2,so it is possible that both IL(FA —IB)c Ic1 A —Ic1B
32— FIB)and kM —> 2A
—2B>''A
—F'8).Uso,then (a,b) is the
unique SPE without the slandard, but (b,b) is the Sit with the standard.
Proof of Theorem 3. If WI(FA)I Wl(ScA), W2(48), and WZ(SB) are the
expressions for expected welfare at the first discovery date under the standard, then
these are defined by (6)-(9)withi4'(.)andCf(.) replacing x1(•) and C(.). Similarly,
let Wç(a.b) and W(a,b) be initial expected welfare under the standard. Then these
are defined by (10) and (11) with Wj(FA). Wl(ScA), W2($B), and W2(SB)









Afterboth A and B are discovered, country 2s flow welfare is 4(B;A) +C(A,B)
with the standard and x2(BA) +C2(A$)without it, so it reduces flow welfare if and
only if ic2(B;A) —4(B;A)+C2(A,B)
—C(A,B)>0.Hence, W2(F2B) >W2(P)and
W2(S78) >W2($u),whence W2(a,b) >W(a,b).
Proof of Theorem 4. From the proof of Theorem 3, if flow welfare is higher with the
standard alter both are discovered, x2(BA) —48;A)+C2(A,B)
—C(A.B)<0,then
W2(4) >W2(F29).However, note that C2(A) >0implies W2(S2B) >W2(S8)can




+ 2g),it is possible that WZ(FB) >W2(F2B).W2(S2B) >W2(Sc).and
either W(a,b) >W2(a,b)or W2(a,b) >W(a.b).
Proof of Theorem 5. Finn 2s strongly dominant strategy is to buy a license if
>S(when A is discovered first) and [E2(A;A)/r] —L>ic(B;A)/r(when B
is discovered first). It is easily shown that [g2(AA)/rJ —L>,t(B;A)/rimplies
33B >SB.Hence, whether A is discovered first or second, firm 2s strongly
dominant strategy is to buy If [E2(A;A)/r] —L>,t(BA)/r, or
L <12 =fr2(A;A)-
where(Al) and (As) imply 12> 0.Therefore, given any compulsory fee L <4, firm
Is stronglydominant strategy isto offertoseu a license at L1A> (whenA Is
discoveredfirst) and (x1(kA)/r]+L> itç(A;B)/r (when BIsdiscovered first).
BecauseFA> IAimplies (,t1(A;A)/rJ+ L>x(A;B)/r,whetherA is discovered
firstorsecond, firm isstrongly dominantstrategyIs tooffer to sell forany L <L2if
IA >iAOne can show that> 1Aif and only if
L> =[(x1(A)+(js/r)4G¼0))/(r +p)J
—
where(Al) and (A7) imply L1 <0. Thus, whether A is discovered first or second,
the unique SPE of this licensing game is firm I offers to sell and finn2buys for all
LE (L,1Q.



















Because >'Aand <F, it follows that —kiB< — Implies
—
kiDc s(FA —F8).Moreover, (Al). (A2)', and (AS)' imply P(a,b) >
F(a,d)>P(d,d),and P?(b,a) >F(d,a).Hence, if (21) holds, then developing A is
firm l's strongly dominant strategy because P(a,s7) >P(b,Qand P(a,s2) >P(d,s2)
for s2E{a,b,d}.Because km — > — implies4(a,b) >4(a,a).the SPE
musthavefirm I developing A and firm 2 either developing B. delaying, or
randomizing onthesetwo purestrategies. Theresult followsfrom the fact that
P(a,b)P(a,d) if andonlyif xx2(B)/(r+ 1c20.Moreover,if x2(B) ￿
34(r + then "28 ja2(B)/(r + t) and(A2Y canhold simultaneously, so (ii)
can Occur.
Proof of Theorem 7. Under these assumptions. (a,b) is the unique SPE in the p game
and the gamewith no poiicy, while in the c game the unique SPE is (a,b)
if k211 cgz2(B)/(r+ g)and(a,d) if >11n2(B)/(r + ja).Firstsuppose
k23 < in 2(B)/(r + i)• Then W(a,b) — W2(a.b) — W2(F2B) + W2(4B) —
W2(SZB)J/(r + 2p.). One can show WZCF2B) > W2W2)if andonlyif L <Vt where
Lw ((A;/t) — + C2(A,A) — C2(A,B))/r.
Smilarly,W2($B) >W(S2)if andonlyIf L c where
LWb =[r(AA)/rJ
—
[(@/r)x2(BA) — k2B}/(r+4)+(Cj.A,A)/r] — flC2(A)+
4t/r)C2(A,B)}/(r+o1.
Onecanshowthat (A4), +C(A,B)>x2(B;A)+C7(A,B),and C2(A,A) ￿
C2(A) imply both L" >L2and LWb >4, soW2(FB) >W2(F2).Wz(SB) >
W2(S2B),andthusW(a,b) >W2(a,b).
Now suppose k2B >gx2(B)/(r+s)so W(a,d) =sW2(S11)/(r+p4.One can





Because(A4). + C(A,B)>x2(B;A)+C2(A,BLC2(A.A) ￿ C(A), and
+t) implyL'>4,wehave W(a,d) >W2(a,b)also.
35